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I. THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC),'
funded jointly by state and federal governments, has from its inception
been primarily concerned with providing aid to families without fathers.
Although the costs of the program and the number of beneficiaries have
increased dramatically in recent years,' the fundamental character of
AFDC remains unchanged. Efforts to revise the program either
through legislation or administration have been notably unsuccessful.'
Neither the "NOLEO" amendment of 1950,' nor the 1956 and 1962
* The research reported here is part of a larger study of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) financed by funds granted to the Institute for Research
on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, by the Office of Economic Opportunity, pursuant
to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. The opinions expressed in this Article are
those of the authors only.
t Professor of Law and Member of the Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin. A.B. 1954, Princeton University; J.D. 1957, Harvard University.
Member, Illinois and New Jersey Bars.
t Project Specialist, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin.
M.S. 1957, University of Wisconsin.
142 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1969).
2 At present, more than 6.5 million persons receive AFDC benefits, or more than
60 out of every 1000 children. In 1955, the comparable proportion was only 30 out
of every 1000 children.
Costs have also increased dramatically. Total expenditures for the 15 years
between 1935 and 1950 did not exceed one half billion dollars. The total doubled
between 1950 and 1960. From 1960 to 1967, another one billion in expenditures was
added. Four billion dollars has been estimated as the cost of the program for fiscal
1970. Hearings own Social Security and Welfare ProposalsBefore the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 120 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings].
3
Legislative output has been meagre. In Wisconsin, the program took on its
basic characteristics in the 1920's and remains essentially unchanged. For an analysis
of the Wisconsin history, see Handler & Goodstein, The Legislative Development of
Public Assistance, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 414, 445-50, 456-60. The development of the
federal program is described in G. STENER, SOCIAL INSECuRITy: THE POLITICS OF
[hereinafter cited as STEINER].
442 U.S.C. § 602(a) (11) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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"NOLEO," or "Notice to Law
Enforcement Officials," was an amendment passed by Congress in 1950 in reaction to
the rising number of desertion cases on the then Aid to Dependent Children rolls. It
requires welfare agencies to notify local law enforcement officials whenever aid is
furnished to an abandoned or deserted child. Presumably, notification will trigger
efforts to locate the absent parent. The purpose of the amendment was to induce
a willingness on the part of the deserted mother to cooperate in the attempt to reestablish the father's responsibility for the family.
The NOLEO qualification had no relationship to need, citizenship, or residence.
It increased the number of officials involved in the administration of the program,
and in some instances induced the mother to deprive her child of welfare benefits
rather than to acquiesce in legal harrassment of the father. See STEINR 114-18.
(1167)
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social service amendments,6 nor the 1967 WIN program6 has had more
than a minor impact on AFDC, predictions at the time of enactment
notwithstanding.
Complex administrative systems often remain stubbornly static
despite the need for change. Previous efforts at welfare reform have
depended ultimately on the attitudes of the welfare bureaucracy and the
aid recipients. A change in these attitudes, although not foreseeable in
the near future, is a precondition for any significant change in the
welfare system. A sufficiently radical reform, such as a redistribution
of income through a children's allowance system,7 could circumvent the
welfare bureaucracy and drastically alter the attitudes of the recipient
population; but sweeping change today appears unlikely. Instead, current reform proposals call for modest shifts of income to the poor and
would require a recipient to satisfy numerous conditions to obtain
assistance. For example, President Nixon's proposed Family Assistance Plan (FAP) has a means test, a work test, and social services.'
The proposed FAP payment levels are sufficiently low so that AFDC
will have to remain in operation in at least forty-two states.9 Finally,
although a new federal bureaucracy may administer the federal pro542 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(12)-(13) (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (13)(14) (Supp. IV, 1969). In 1956 and 1962, the Social Security Act was amended to
append a social services component to AFDC. The states were authorized to furnish
rehabilitative and other services to maximize individual capacities for self-support.
The federal government reimburses the states for 50% of their AFDC expenditures,
except in the area of service programs, where the federal figure is 75%. For a
history of this legislation and its general ineffectiveness, see STE INER 34-47. For an
empirical study of the actual administration of the social services established by the
amendments, see Handler & Hollingsworth, The Administration of Social Services
and the Structure of Dependency: The Views of AFDC Recipients, 43 SOCIAL SERv.

REv. 406 (1969).

642 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (19), 630-44 (Supp. IV, 1969). The Work Incentive
Program (WIN) was included in the 1967 amendments to the AFDC program. It
consisted of four parts: (1) a ceiling on the proportion of children under 18 who
would be eligible for AFDC (since repealed); (2) a work incentive program to
increase the employment of AFDC recipients, administered jointly by the Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare; (3) a requirement that local
welfare agencies supply day-care centers for the children of working mothers or
trainees; (4) a liberalized tax treatment of recipient-earned income. For a full
description of the WIN program, see Hausman, The AFDC Amendments of 1967:
Their Impact on the Capacity for Self Support and the Employability of AFDC
Family Heads, 19 LAB. LJ. 496, 506-07 (1968); Comment, Public Welfare "WIN"
Program: Armn-Twisting Incentives, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1062 (1969). See generally
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INCOME MAIN'T PROGRAMS, POVERTY AmiD PLENTY: THE
AmERIcAN PARADOx 57-75 (1969).
7Examples of different approaches include a credit income tax, a children's and
adult's allowance, and a negative income tax. An analysis of these plans is provided by Tobin, Raising the Incomes of the Poor, in AGENDA FOR THE NATION 77,
105-14 (K. Gordon ed. 1968).
An explanation of the
8 H.R. 16311, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 101-02 (1970).
provisions of the Family Assistance Act of 1969 may be found in Hearings 49-63.
9 The basic level of support for a family of four under FAP would be $1600.
States presently disbursing benefits above $1600 would be required to make up the
difference between the federal floor and the present state level to assure maintenance
of the AFDC recipients' current income. Only 8 states distribute less than $1600
annually. See Hearings 126.
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gram, this task may well be delegated to existing state welfare agencies
in conformity with the prevailing pattern in welfare programs. 10 Thus,
FAP promises no profound change in the basic structure of the present
welfare system."
One version of the final chapter of a study of AFDC that we
conducted, this Article presents our views of the major characteristics
of the welfare bureaucracy and the welfare recipients in relation to
the problems of welfare reform.'
II. METHODOLOGY

The primary data for this study were survey responses from 766
Wisconsin AFDC families interviewed in six counties. 3 A second
series of interviews was conducted with families who had terminated
AFDC payments approximately two months earlier. Interviews were
also conducted with state officials, county welfare directors, and caseworkers.
The sample was drawn from the March 1967 AFDC payment
records of the Wisconsin State Department of Health and Social
Services (State Department). Because AFDC has always been pri10 The Family Assistance Act does not indicate whether the states or the federal
government will administer the program. See id. 77.
31 But see N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1969, at 32, col. 1, in which Daniel P. Moynihan,
a principal advisor to President Nixon, expressed concern about the lack of support
for the President's proposed welfare reform and called the proposed FAP legislation
"epic: This view contrasts sharply with Moynihan's earlier views, from a more
academic prospective, of the prospects for welfare reform:
What we can do is to improve it somewhat. It is an American fault to
insist on extravagant goals-as if to set out to achieve anything less than
everything suggests a lack of sincerity, manliness, or both-and to be exceedingly busy with other matters when it subsequently develops that little
or nothing happened. The social history of the 1960's is already littered
with the wreckage of crash programs that were going to change everything
and in fact changed nothing, save possibly to diminish ever so slightly the
credibility of those who claimed in advance for the achievements that never,
somehow, came to pass.
Moynihan, The Crisis in Welfare, 10 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3, 6 (1968).
12 The study is scheduled to be published under sponsorship of the Institute for
Research on Poverty of the University of Wisconsin as a book entitled THE "DESERVING" PooR: A STUDY oF WELFARE ADMINISTRATION. Most of its chapters have
been published as articles reporting the data from which the conclusions of this
Article have been drawn. Handler & Hollingsworth, Stignia, Privacy, and Other
Attitudes of Welfare Recipients, 22 STAN. L. Rxv. 1 (1969); Handler & Hollingsworth, The Administration of Welfare Budgets: The Views of AFDC Recipients,
5 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 208 (1970); Handler & Hollingsworth, The Administration
of Social Services and the Structure of Dependency: The Views of AFDC Recipients, 43 SocI~L. SmEv. REv. 406 (1969) ; Handler & Hollingsworth, How Obnoxious
is the "Obnoxious Means Test"? The Views of AFDC Recipients, 1970 Wis. L. Rzv.
114; Handler & Hollingsworth, Work, Welfare, and the Nixon Reform Proposal,
22 STAN. L. REv. 907 (1970) ; Handler & Goodstein, supra note 3. See also Handler,
Justice for the Welfare Recipient: Fair Hearings in AFDC-The Wisconsin Experience, 43 SocILr SRav. REv. 12 (1969).
13 Three of the counties, Milwaukee, Dane, and Brown, contained a large or
moderate sized city. The other three were primarily rural.
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marily concerned with households headed by mothers, an attempt was
made to exclude from the sample those families in which a father was
present. Because many of the questions centered on quality, quantity,
and evaluation of client-caseworker-agency relationships, only women
who had been on the rolls for at least six months were included. 14
In the two most urban counties, Milwaukee and Dane (Madison),
proportional samples were drawn reflecting the distribution of AFDC
recipients into "wed" and "unwed" categories. Within each category,
a random sample was drawn that met the criteria outlined above. In
Brown County (Green Bay), a random sample was selected. In the
three rural counties, all AFDC recipients who had been in the program
six months were asked to participate.
Each potential respondent was sent a letter requesting her cooperation in the study and informing her that she would be contacted
by an interviewer. Refusal was accomplished by tearing off the bottom
portion of the letter and returning it, in an enclosed stamped envelope,
to the Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratoiy, which handled the
drawing of the sample and all of the interviewing. Women who
initially refused were contacted again by letter and asked to reconsider;
several thereupon agreed to be interviewed.
The interviews, lasting approximately one hour, were taken in the
summer and fall of 1967. Respondents were paid three dollars for the
interview. Coordinated and trained by the Wisconsin Survey Research
Laboratory, interviewers were usually residents of the community in
which the respondent lived. Approximately eighty percent of those
approached agreed to be interviewed. 5
Evaluation of survey responses is always subject to uncertainty.
Partly as a check on the validity of this data and partly to determine
the effect of terminating welfare, the women who had left the program
were again interviewed approximately two months later. Again,
women were approached by letter from the Wisconsin Survey Research
Laboratory, and interviewed this time for approximately thirty minutes.
Great internal consistency was evident in the responses, including
the responses of the women interviewed after leaving welfare. The
data and responses analyzed here appear to be consistent with the few
14 The decision to base the sample on comparatively long-term recipients introduces some bias into the study. Although respondents had more experience with
caseworkers and a more prolonged exposure to the welfare mechanism than shortterm recipients, they might also have had a higher incidence of loss of memory or
of repression of bad experiences. These recipients may have already made some adjustment to welfare.
.5 The question arises whether that portion of the AFDC population which
voluntarily agreed to the interview process is significantly different from that which
refused. This is, of course, impossible to discover, but between the agreeing and
refusing groups only slight differences were found in regard to age, race, number of
children, time in the AFDC program, and marital status.
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available studies of AFDC recipients in other parts of the country, particularly New York City. 6 This consistency, as will be pointed out
below, is a result of uniform characteristics of welfare systems throughout the country; for this reason, the welfare administration in Wisconsin
seems sufficiently representative to serve as a model for an examination
of the essential elements of the welfare system-the welfare bureaucracy
and the welfare recipients.
III. THE WELFARE BUREAUCRACY
A. Decentralization: ContributingFactors
The single most important characteristic of the welfare bureaucracy is its decentralized structure. In about half the states, AFDC is
administered by county departments of welfare and supervised by state
agencies. Because a county-administered system was studied, the
conclusions drawn from this data are technically limited to a county
system. But, for reasons to be discussed shortly, decentralization is
also a major characteristic of state-administered systems. Certain
aspects of the welfare system foster decentralization while opposing
factors tend to produce uniform results despite decentralization.
Four major factors contribute to decentralization in welfare administration: (1) the jurisdictional division of authority; (2) the
structure of welfare rules; (3) the nature of the work of the agency;
and (4) the problems of supervision and control.
1. Division of Authority
In Wisconsin, county departments of welfare are not merely adjuncts of the State Department, but separate entities retaining substantial authority and political influence over welfare matters in the
state legislature. Except during the late 1930's, when federal concern
was pronounced, the legislature has refused to make major jurisdictional changes in the allocation of power between the counties and
the State Department. Subsequent centralization of state power has
occurred as a result of opinions of the attorney general, federal pressure, and various administrative practices, such as consultation, liaison
work, and state-run training sessions. Whether because of the political
power of the county government or governmental inertia, the legislature has declined to alter county-state division of authority. In fact,
state officials acknowledge that converting Wisconsin to a state16See Briar, Welfare From Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare

System, in THE LAw OF THE POOR 46 (J. tenBroek ed. 1966) ; H. Yahr, R. Pomeroy,
& L. Podell, Studies in Public Welfare (mimeograph by the Center for the Study
of Urban Problems, City University of New York).
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supervised system is "out of the question" at the present time.-7 Decentralization is in part the result of the legislative tendency-certainly
not unique to Wisconsin-to avoid intervention. 8
The implementation of welfare policy thus rests with county
departments characterized by individualized procedures and primarily
responsive to their political governing body, the county board of supervisors, which in turn is responsive to the local community. The county
welfare directors emphasized in interviews how important they felt
local groups were. 9 The state agency-the State Department-does
exercise some countervailing pressures towards uniformity. From
time to time it examines records and reports and examines particular
county agencies. It also consults on the appointment of new county
welfare directors and establishes statewide standards for personnel.
Although the extent of state agency influence varies from county to
county, the realization that counties and their departments of welfare
are independent centers of political power working in a local context
is the first step toward understanding administrative decentralization
in the welfare bureaucracy.
2. The Structure of Welfare Rules
The system of welfare rules facilitates decentralized administration
in the welfare bureaucracy in two ways. First, some rules specifically
grant authority to county welfare departments: for example, the legislature has explicitly recognized the discretionary authority of county
departments to deal with employment problems of AFDC recipients.2 °
Second, vague and indefinite rules require the local authorities to exercise varying degrees of discretion. The dominant characteristic of welfare legislation is its high level of abstraction. AFDC statutes usually
leave undefined even the most basic elements of the programs: standards
for need, level of benefits, contributions from responsible relatives, moral
conditions of welfare parents, availability and application of social
services.
17The history of Wisconsin's welfare system is described in Handier & Goodstein, supra note 3, at 441-43, 452-60.
18 See Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 STAir. L.
Rzv. 786, 828-37 (1967).
19 The results of these interviews will be reported in chapter two of the forthcoming book, but they are now available in mimeographed form: Communities,
Agencies, and Clients, 1969 (Institute for Research on Poverty, University of
Wisconsin).
20 The county agency [department of welfare] may require the mother to do
such remunerative work as in its judgment she can do without detriment to
her health or the neglect of her children or her home ....
Wis. STAT. § 49.19, cl. 6 (1967).
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Welfare statutes are vague partly because welfare problems are
seldom susceptible to objective, clearly defined solutions, and are often
best resolved on a case-by-case basis. Vagueness also often reflects the
power confrontation between state and local governments and the
legislative practice of avoiding issues involving intergovernmental or
moral conflicts. Most important, substantive welfare issues raise precisely the issues that politicians try to avoid. Legislatures may speak
in abstractions, but administrators must implement programs with
specific decisions. Thus vague legislative rules effectively delegate
decisionmaking authority to the administrators. In this manner, Wisconsin administrative agencies have been granted the authority to decide
need, benefits, moral conditions, employment, and many other issues.
Within the administrative system itself, vague rules produce similar decentralization. For example, although the Wisconsin State
Department specifies in great detail the allowances for most items in
the budget, rent allowances, a major portion of every recipient's budget,
must only be "reasonable" in light of local conditions. Such an indefinite formulation vests discretion in local officials to determine
reasonableness. Even when allowances are specified in fixed dollar
amounts, the conditions for qualifying for the allowances are unspecified.
3. The Nature of the Work
Implementing welfare programs at the field level results in a
decentralization of authority because of individual family needs and
the professional response to those needs. The theory of the incomemaintenance component of AFDC is to provide a fairly uniform subsistence grant with provisions for additional payments to meet special
needs. Social services are also tailored to individual family needs.
Official administrative policy recognizes that welfare families have
different problems, will make different demands on the agencies, and
should receive different treatment. Correspondingly, the regulations
emphasize flexibility at the field level.
Social work philosophy also stresses individualized professional
treatment. Although most public assistance caseworkers lack professional social work training, they adopt this professional position at least
at the rhetorical level." Official and professional encouragement of
individualized treatment, combined with varying qualities of administration, leads to different applications of particular rules by different
21

Data on the characteristics and attitudes of the caseworkers is reported in
Communities, Agencies, and Clients, supra note 19. For descriptions of professional
social work philosophy, see STEINER 196-204; Handler & Hollingsworth, The Adiniistration of Social Services and the Structure of Dependency: The Views of
AFDC Recipients, supra note 12, at 412-19.
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caseworkers. One caseworker might ask certain questions at intake
or disclose the availability of certain special grants while another would
take a different approach. In addition, a caseworker's attitude towards
a particular client is an individual matter-whether the caseworker is
sympathetic and understanding or suspicious and hostile will depend to
a large extent on his personal temperament. The subjects discussed
during the home visit, the degree of concern about employment or men
in the house, and the amount of encouragement given children to pursue
education and training, will inevitably vary among caseworkers. Thus,
because the problems and needs of each welfare family vary and the
problems of any one family change over time, and because caseworkers
bring to their jobs differing attitudes and abilities, a flexibly structured, highly decentralized system is likely to result.
4. The Lack of Systematic Control
Under existing methods of supervision and control, many discretionary decisions by the caseworkers escape detection at the state
level, and possibly even at the county supervisor level. This lack of
supervision of field-level activities results in the failure of caseworkers
to disclose to clients the availability of different programs or to inform
them of their rights under current programs. This problem does not
readily come to the attention of supervisors through normal methods
of supervision because the current system depends largely on complaints by clients to control caseworkers, and a client can hardly complain if he is unaware that he has not been fully informed. Individual
caseworkers report that they do not bother to enforce responsible relative laws or the taxing rules or do not require disclosure of the father's
name by an unwed mother. Existing patterns for supervision thus
provide only a minimal check on the individual caseworker's implementation of the welfare program.
Based on conversations with state supervisors, county welfare
directors, and caseworkers, our impression is that the top bureaucrats
have only an imprecise grasp of the details of field-level operations.
They lack the resources, techniques, and perhaps the will, to become
familiar with field activities and are distracted by other administrative
concerns such as agency morale and community relations. Some
agency officials noted that from time to time they would read case
records under federal quality control procedures and monitor statistical
reports evidencing large differences in expenditure patterns, but they
were simply unaware of the degree to which administrative discretion
was being exercised over a whole range of issues.
The complaining client is likewise insufficient to control local discretion effectively. AFDC recipients have long had the right to appeal
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any decision of the county department of welfare to the state agency.
From the state agency's point of view, one of the purposes of this
appeal (or fair hearing) is to detect weaknesses or illegality in county
administration which may then be corrected by hearing officer decisions
or by changes in state regulations. As a method of control, the fair
hearing process has been almost a complete failure. The vast majority
of clients are either ignorant of their right to a fair hearing or how to
exercise it, and lack the resources (including access to attorneys) or the
willingness to challenge the caseworker and the agency.22 The next
section will deal more fully with client attitudes, but it should be noted
that the fair hearing remedy raises significant problems for recipients,
whose primary concerns are maintaining security and minimizing contact with the welfare bureaucracy, and who must deal with the county
agency after the appeal.
The situation is different, of course, when welfare recipients are
organized and have access to capable, energetic attorneys. Under these
circumstances, clients have had notable success in curbing welfare
abuses and in obtaining benefits by controlling official discretion.23
But because of the recent publicity and attention focused on the activities of welfare rights organizations, their importance may be easily
exaggerated. Most recipients are passive, dependent, and interested
primarily in stability. Because generally unaware of the benefits to
which they are entitled and expecting little from the program, they do
not perceive injustice or feel aggrieved. These characteristics greatly
hamper the growth of welfare rights organizations and contribute to
the more basic problem of communicating information to welfare recipients. Welfare rights organizations probably touch only a very
small minority of recipients. In addition to these weaknesses of welfare
rights organizations, the effectiveness of attorneys in producing significant changes in welfare administration is also questionable. Poverty
lawyers frequently complain of the frustrations and difficulties of dealing with agencies and, in particular, of enforcing court decrees and fair
hearing decisions. Finally, the effectiveness of welfare rights organizations may make life for the vast majority of recipients more difficult;
the bureaucracy, if it responds at all, responds to those who actively
make demands rather than to the great majority of silent, passive, dependent recipients. The supervision provided by client organizations
22
For an empirical study of the fair hearing system in Wisconsin, see Handler,
Tiistice for the Welfare Recipient: Fair Hearings in AFDC-The Wisconsin Experience, supra note 12.
23 For one of many discussions of the ability of welfare rights organizations to
secure benefits for welfare recipients, see Gellhorn, Poverty and Legality: The Laws
Slow Awakening, 9 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 285 (1967).
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and their lawyers works sporadically for relatively few recipients and
has little effect on local discretion and decentralization of authority.
Thus, the jurisdictional division of authority, the structure of
welfare rules, the nature of the work, and lack of supervisory control
all contribute to produce an enormous amount of discretionary authority at the field level. AFDC caseworkers have great leeway in
administering the program. Consequently, great variation in actual
administration might be expected. Although the six welfare departments
surveyed were located in communities of different political, economic,
social, and urban character, surprising uniformity of administration
was discovered. The welfare directors differed in backgrounds, attitudes towards the agency, conceptions of the program, priorities and
goals, reflecting the social, moral, and political conflicts of each community. Administration at the field level, however, was characterized
by a general pattern of uniformity and similarity in administration
throughout the six counties. Given the great flexibility in administration caused by decentralization of authority and the quite different
political, economic, and social environment of each agency, what accounts for this general pattern of uniformity?
B. Uniformity: The Contributing Factors
We think that such unexpected uniformity results from structural
factors producing a strategy of withdrawal. Opposing the structural
factors resulting in decentralization and discretion at the field level are
factors encouraging caseworkers to exercise their discretion in a
manner minimizing involvement with welfare recipients. Four factors
contributing to this lack of involvement or withdrawal are: (1) the
pressure of work; (2) the attitudes of the caseworkers; (3) the attitudes and expectations of the recipients; and (4) the benefits or resources at the disposal of the caseworkers.
1. The Pressure of Work
The effect of large numbers of recipients on administration of a
welfare program is staggering. The major elements of AFDC administration-eligibility determination, budget, and social services (including employment)-presume individualized treatment, but such
individual attention requires greater time and energy than public assistance caseworkers can expend. Harsh and punitive as well as liberal
and progressive administration requires time and effort. Large numbers of applicants preclude detailed and complicated inquiries concerning
the possibilities of support by relatives, employment, or whereabouts
of the father. Because caseworkers visit AFDC homes on an average
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of once every three months for approximately thirty minutes, most
clients receive no close supervision of budget expenditures, no careful
exploration of special needs (unless the client raises the issue), no
investigation of earned income, no meaningful social service programs,
and no real concern for moral behavior in the absence of unusual circumstances. Although complaints of neighbors (especially if made to
the district attorney or police), a sudden and dramatic deterioration of
family life, or an emergency will alter this pattern, ordinarily the caseworker is likely only to make the minimum number of home visits and
complete the prescribed forms.2"
2. Attitudes of the Caseworkers
Individualized administration, whether harsh or liberal, also requires that a caseworker care enough about his job and his clients to,
for example, work out a social service program, process special needs,
or look for men in the house. When interviewed, public assistance
caseworkers adopted professional social work rhetoric, but in practice
seemed to lack the commitment demanded by nonuniform administration. For the most part, they are young college graduates with only
modest professional training, are not members of professional social
work organizations, have been with the agencies only a very short
time, lack field experience elsewhere, and do not expect to be in public
assistance work very long. They view their jobs as merely temporary
positions and not as careers. Thus the turnover rate for public assistance caseworkers is extremely high. In our sample, most clients saw
the same caseworker only about three times before a new one appeared.
These attitudes foster a lack of individualized administration and minimize the initiative of many caseworkers.
3. Client Attitudes
Client attitudes and expectations about the welfare program and
the caseworker promote nonindividual administration.
The great
majority of recipients in this survey expressed positive attitudes toward
the welfare program and the caseworker within a framework of very
low expectations. Beyond assuring basic economic security (at a fairly
low level), the program and caseworkers provided little additional
24The results of a New York study of AFDC recipients reveal the minimal
impact that caseworkers have on recipients.
"Negative eligibility attitudes" are
unrelated to either the frequency or the duration of home visits:
It may be that the combination of relatively high caseloads, and the heavy
and urgent demand of ADC clients primarily for financial assistance, left
too little leeway for the factors considered in the formulation of Hypothesis 1
[that negative eligibility attitudes are inversely related to the frequency of
home visits] to operate.
H. Yahr, R. Pomeroy, & L. Podell, vtpra note 16, at 9.
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assistance. Although they spoke well of caseworkers, the recipients
were uninterested in increasing caseworker visits and thought that the
caseworker could do little more for them. Their positive attitudes resulted largely from the kind of interview conducted by caseworkersa friendly chat about general topics of concern to single women running
families. Usually the caseworkers avoided sensitive or specific issues
such as social life, relations with men, and home care, and topics which
might have led to complaints or demands. Within this context, clients
Those
found the home visit somewhat pleasant and nonthreatening.
25
who received unannounced visits usually did not object.
Exceptions to this pattern of positive client attitudes arose when
a more sensitive or detailed approach was adopted. When caseworkers
expressed disapproval of certain conduct, clients reacted negatively.
Conversely, when caseworkers had something tangible to give, clients
reacted much more positively. When caseworkers helped in more intangible ways, clients acknowledged the help but also indicated that
they were "bothered or annoyed" with the discussions. When clients
were bothered or annoyed by specific caseworker discussions, they were
also more likely to be less trusting of the caseworker, to have even
lower expectations of what the caseworker could do, and to be less
inclined to believe that the caseworker generally had a good reason
for what he did. As long as the caseworkers avoided playing a meaningful role-whether positive or negative-in the lives of the clients,
client passivity and, more importantly, overall satisfaction, were the
usual result. Unless the caseworkers could deliver tangible goods, a
more meaningful interaction ran risks of alienating the clients.
4. Lack of Resources
With the exception of health care, caseworkers could obtain little
additional assistance for the clients. Some caseworkers tried hard to
get their clients grants for special needs or acceptance into special
programs, but they were the exception rather than the rule. AFDC
simply lacks many extra benefits to distribute. The usual strategy for
the public assistance caseworker was to discuss only general topics with
clients and to avoid raising expectations that might lead to unpleasantness and additional work. This strategy required a caseworker to
ignore illegal or dubious practices such as failure to report earned
income, relations with men, and particular questionable expenditures.
Because the resources available to the welfare recipient through AFDC
25 For a detailed description of the caseworker-client relationship, see Handler
& Hollingsworth, The Administration of Social Services and the Structure of Dependency: The Views of AFDC Recipients, supra note 12. For data on the unannounced visit, see Handler & Hollingsworth, Stigma, Privacy, and Other Attitudes of

Welfare Recipients, supra note 12, at 10-13.
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are minimal, caseworkers tended to develop a general attitude of
moderation, neither seeking actively to make additional benefits available nor enforcing strictly limitations on existing benefits.
The welfare bureaucracy is characterized by decentralization of
authority and great discretion at the field level. But caseworkers
usually exercise this discretion to minimize involvement with the welfare recipients. AFDC remains basically a low-level, income-maintenance program characterized by potential flexibility and practical
uniformity.
IV. THE WELFARE RECIPIENTS: RELATIVE DEPRIVATION
A laissez-faire pattern of administration explains many of the recipients' responses. In general, the respondents made few requests for
special needs and seldom participated in special programs. Grants were

changed only occasionally. The general superficiality of the home visit
resulted in few feelings of coercion or annoyance. The recipients
found caseworker discussions somewhat helpful, and reported that they
liked their caseworkers, but expected little from them. Because the
AFDC program provides little more than minimal financial support,
the clients' use of the program and their manner of termination depended on their own resources and on the opportunities available in the
community. White, educated clients with small families were more
likely to achieve independence than those unable to mobilize their own
resources to take advantage of whatever opportunities the community
offered.
The absence of negative feelings on the part of the recipients is
understandable in light of the unobtrusive nature of administration;
but the generally high levels of satisfaction with most aspects of the
program, retained even by those who had left the program, is surprising. For example, approximately eighty percent of those interviewed
said that they liked, trusted, and enjoyed talking with their caseworker;
that they made a special effort to stay on good terms with him; that
the caseworker usually had a good reason for what he did; and that they
contacted their caseworker at times other than the regular visit. More
than eighty percent of the original sample plus those who had left the
program felt that the welfare experience was satisfactory in view of
their needs, and over ninety percent of those who had withdrawn from
the program said that they were either always or usually treated fairly
by the agency and the caseworkers.
We think that these positive attitudes can be explained by a concept
of relative deprivation.6 The attitudes of the recipients were shaped
26

For an excellent discussion of this concept, see W. RUNCimAN,
(1966).
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by their frames of reference-their experiences before welfare, their
views of their needs, their welfare receipts, and their expectations and
aspirations.
Respondents' present family lives compared unfavorably with their
childhood. Most respondents recalled being raised in unified families,
and although the occupations of their parents resembled their own,
most indicated that their parents had not relied on welfare for support.
Their families were certainly not affluent, but the respondents recalled
childhoods of harmony, stability, and moderate comfort. For most,
living conditions were uncrowded, there was always enough to eat,
money was available for special treats, and their parents got along
well.17
On the other hand, adult life for most of these women was harsh and
economic insecurity pervasive. Those who married did so when quite
young, and neither they nor their husbands had much education or
occupational skill. Only about half of the respondents had had husbands who provided a regular source of income; the other half either
never married or married someone who supported the family only
sporadically. In addition, almost every respondent was abandoned by
the father of her children.
In strictly economic terms, the AFDC program provided a
regular source of income at a level higher than its beneficiaries could
earn." The program returned stability to their lives. They continually
emphasized that they favored the AFDC program not only because it
provided a steady source of income, but also because it relieved them
of the burden of trying to obtain support from the fathers of their
children. The program satisfied the most pressing needs of the recipients, providing them some measure of security with a minimum
intrusion into their lives. The length of time between eligibility for
AFDC and application was relatively short, suggesting that the
economic predicament of these families was quite serious. Following
the intake process-generally restricted to determining financial eligibility and calculating a budget-the welfare checks came regularly, and
the caseworkers seldom intervened actively in client affairs either to
investigate possible misconduct or to suggest additional options. The
clients expected little and were satisfied with what they got. The
positive attitudes of the clients toward the caseworkers were expressed
within this framework of very low expectations. For example, most
said that the caseworkers visited "often enough" regardless of the fre27
These background characteristics (as recalled by respondents) are reported in
Communities, Agencies, and Clients, supra note 19.
28 The economic benefits of welfare as compared to employment for these respondents are discussed in Handler & Hollingsworth, Work, Welfare, and the Nixon
Reform Proposal, supra note 12. See also Hausman, supra note 6.
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quency of visits, that caseworkers could do nothing more even if they
had more freedom and time, and that requests and calls to caseworkers
decreased with time in the program. Three-quarters of those who
had withdrawn from the program said that the caseworker was helpful
in seeing that they got the most out of the program. Asked to detail
what the caseworker had done for them, however, one-third replied
"nothing" and most of the rest said that the caseworkers helped to get
them money and health care. Two-thirds indicated that the caseworker
could have done nothing more for them.
Although the pattern of low expectations is the norm, two other
patterns are significant to an analysis of welfare recipients. One group
of survey respondents was not "well adjusted" to welfare status and
made better use of the welfare system than the majority. Those falling
in this category were less satisfied and less accepting; they asked for
more and participated more fully in the benefits of the program.2" The
other important pattern was apparent when caseworkers procured
tangible benefits for recipients. In this situation, clients were found
to be highly dependent. For example, caseworkers could give clients
concrete help in obtaining health care, and most clients said that discussions with caseworkers in this area were very helpful. They indicated that they felt obliged to follow the caseworkers' advice all or
most of the time. In contrast, clients felt that discussions about social
life and home care were not particularly helpful, and that they were
not compelled to accept the caseworkers' advice in these areas.30
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM

Inherent in the welfare bureaucracy are many problems sustained
by the attitudes of welfare recipients. The welfare bureaucracy is
characterized by decentralization resulting in broad discretion at the
field levels of administration. Only countervailing forces encouraging
minimization of involvement with clients prevent completely arbitrary
administrative actions. This lack of caseworker involvement presents
the least threatening situation to welfare beneficiaries seeking only a
limited degree of financial security and personal stability; consequently
they react positively to caseworkers and seldom complain of lack of
assistance.
The uncontrolled flexibility of the system permits inconsistent responses when an agency is staffed by truly concerned caseworkers or by
those responding easily to political or social pressure. Furthermore,
29 See Handler & Hollingswortb, Stigma, Privacy, and Other Attitudes of Welfare Recipients, pra note 12, at 7-9.
SO See Handier & Hollingsworth, The Administration of Social Services and the
Structure of Dependency: The Views of AFDC Recipients, supra note 12, at 408-09.
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the passivity of most welfare recipients and the corresponding weakness of welfare rights organizations inhibits even those clients desiring
to break from this pattern and to assert their rights more forcefully. In
short, although the Wisconsin welfare system, which we believe is
representative of many others in this country, currently satisfies the
extremely low expectations of the welfare clients, the uncontrolled discretion resting in lower administrative officials presents a potential
vehicle for arbitrary action and abuse.
In light of these basic characteristics of the welfare system, the
implications of three techniques of reform should be examined: (1)
coercive rules with protective standards, (2) rehabilitative social service
programs, and (3) discretionary distribution of benefits.
The present welfare system contains many coercive rules with
protective standards embodying conditions for aid. For example, an
unwed mother in Wisconsin must, if she can, supply the name of the
putative father. The qualification of knowledge theoretically protects
her, and she has the right to a fair hearing to challenge an adverse
decision. But a closer examination reveals the inadequacy of this protection: Who has the burden of proof of knowledge? How can lack of
knowledge be proven? What evidence must the unwed mother adduce?
A woman applying for welfare has suffered a severe personal crisis and
faces the difficult problem of providing the necessities of life for her
children. Her social and economic condition, and particularly her lack
of psychological and economic resources, seriously limit her ability to
invoke protective provisions even if such provisions are fairly administered by the welfare agencies.
The most prominent example of a coercive rule with a protective
standard, and the one most important for current reform proposals,
deals with employment. Employment requirements in various forms
have always been conditions for public assistance. President Nixon's
proposed Family Assistance Plan similarly will require all recipients
(with limited exceptions) to register with state employment agencies
and will deny aid to recipients refusing to accept offers of employment
or training.3 Similar work requirements are now part of the AFDC
program under the 1967 Work Incentive Program. The protective
standards are variously stated. The offer of employment must be
"bona fide," adequate day-care arrangements for the children must be
available, the work or training must not be detrimental to the "best
interests of the family," and it must be "suitable." 32 As indicated
above, these rules in effect delegate discretionary authority to the field
level. Under present bureaucratic conditions, such discretion means
31
32

See Hearings 63-64 (proposed Family Assistance Act of 1969, §§ 447-48).
45 C.F.R. §§ 220.17, 220.18, & 220.35 (1970).
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that for most recipients the work requirement will be a minor irritant
or formality because field-level officials have neither the time nor the
interest to seek out work or training for recipients. For some, opportunities will be created, but for most, such rules will result in punitive
regulation and harassment. The manner in which particular agencies
and officials interpret and apply these vague standards is uncertain at
best, but the vast majority of recipients cannot protect themselves from
improper employment decisions. As noted, most recipients are passive,
dependent, without knowledge of their rights or the resources to enforce
them, and must continue to deal with the agencies after a challenge
to this discretion is raised.
These considerations apply to all coercive rules with protective
standards. As a practical matter, protective standards do not protect
welfare recipients, and whether coercion will be applied depends upon
the discretion of officials.
The efficacy of rehabilitative social service programs as a technique
of welfare reform is doubtful. No real social service activity takes
place within the welfare program. Although variously defined, the
term "social services" refers essentially to services requiring fairly
intensive personal interaction between the caseworker and the welfare
family or particular members of the family. Social services are not
necessarily restricted to psychological problems but reach all kinds of
problems detrimental to family well-being. Personal, professional
counseling may be used to work out an employment program fitting
a particular job into satisfactory day-care arrangements, or to establish
a vocational program for a teenage daughter, or to provide budget and
home care assistance, or to encourage the use of community resources.
But a meaningful social services program requires competent, interested workers with time and resources at their disposal. Such qualified
caseworkers have been unobtainable-a situation unlikely to change
dramatically in the near future.
In light of the Wisconsin AFDC experience, the federal government should reorganize or discontinue financing public assistance social
service programs. Federal financing procedure has been to offer the
states an additional twenty-five percent of the administrative costs, including the caseworkers' salaries, for social services for "defined
service" cases. Because the only standards used to evaluate social
services are very crude quantitative indicators, such as the frequency
of caseworker visits, an agency may easily qualify for the additional
aid without changing service levels. In fact, this was the situation in
the Wisconsin counties studied. According to the clients, very little
service activity existed. Both state officials and the quantitative data
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corroborated the clients' observations. Although the minimum federal
requirements do not in any way insure meaningful social services,
agencies lack incentive to provide additional services. Because the
agencies will not receive any more money for doing a good job, the
costs of administrative effort beyond the bare minimum necessary for
the additional federal dollars the costs of really helping a familymust be borne by the agency and the caseworkers. Thus the agency
usually restricts its costs by providing only the minimum services
required.
The most serious and intractable problem in welfare administration, the discretionary distribution of benefits, speaks loudest for legislative reform. From a liberal-reformist perspective, the policy issues
and goals of the first two reform techniques are fairly clear and, assuming the political will, capable of considerable reform. Coercive conditions can be eliminated from the welfare system. Eligibility can be
made to depend on a fairly simple income and resources test administered by a self-declaration system as now utilized successfully in
some areas of the country. The issues, policy considerations, costs, and
remedies for responsible relatives laws, men-in-the-house rules, and
regulations dealing with moral behavior are fairly well delineated.
Similarly, welfare recipients may be encouraged to seek work by adjusting the rate of the welfare grant as earned income increases to make
work profitable and by creating job opportunities rather than by forcing
people to work by threatening to terminate benefits.
Solutions for social service programs are much more complicated,
but we suggest the following general approach: if social services are
considered to be important, and if public assistance welfare agencies are
incapable of administering them, then different, independently funded
agencies should be delegated the authority over social services programs. Judging by past experience with OEO legal services and
Medicaid, this solution is by no means free of difficulties, but at least
it may be free of the decentralization and potential abuses of discretion
characteristic of current AFDC administration.
The problems raised by discretionary distribution of benefits, however, are far more difficult to eliminate. The analysis of the administration of social services programs and of the caseworker-client relationship led to the conclusion that client dependency was created not so
much by coercion as by the power of caseworkers to give clients
tangible benefits. When caseworkers exercised this power, client
gratitude, satisfaction, and feelings of dependency increased considerably. The feelings displayed by these welfare recipients were not
necessarily tied to a legally coercive system, but were also evident in
a variety of voluntary situations. Dependency is simply a fact of life
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when government officials have discretionary authority over benefits
people want and need. Client dependency created by this relationship
will remain so long as individual treatment is needed in welfare systems.
The great emphasis on reform today looks to standardization of
welfare administration by simplifying procedures for the determination
of eligibility and the level of benefits. Standardization reduces official
discretion and thus client dependency. Unless benefits are very high,
however, many families will still be unable to function within socially
acceptable limits for a variety of reasons. Although its budget may
be adequate, a family may have unusual debts or expenses, or be incapable of managing what it receives. The present AFDC program
recognizes this situation in theory and provides special need grants for
emergencies or for unusual circumstances of a more continuing nature,
such as special diets. Unless the social costs of economic hardship and
family deterioration are to be imposed on the family, some system of
individualized treatment must be made available. But any such system
creates exactly the problems of discretionary administration inherent in
the present AFDC program. Progress can be made toward objectifying standards, requiring communication of information, and setting
up different administrative structures, but these improvements will
ultimately depend upon the quality of administration.
Dependency created by the distribution of benefits is also an inherent feature of social services. The above analysis reveals that
dependency increases according to the extent that social services provide tangible benefits. This is an additional reason for not strengthening the social services departments of public welfare agencies because
either the departments will not carry out the social services programs,
or the already excessive powers of welfare agencies over recipients
will increase even further.
Developments in England illustrate this problem . 3 Prior to 1963,
the Children's Departments of the Local Authority, community governments roughly equivalent to our county governments, administered
child protection programs. They would receive children "into care"
when parents could no longer provide for them or when courts ordered
children removed from their homes because of delinquency, dependency,
or neglect. In 1963, powers of the Children's Departments were significantly extended to deal broadly with "problem families," families
which had problems with the marriage, child-rearing, the police, budget
management, creditors, housing authorities, or poor health. As the
Local Authority's principal social work agency, the Children's Depart33 See Report of the Committee on Local Authority and Allied Personal Social
Services, Cmnd. No. 3703 (1968), summarized in Seebohm Report, 12 NEw Soc'Y

124 (1968).
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ments were given the power to make emergency cash grants for "unusual circumstances" and to work out arrangements with other public
and private agencies that figured prominently in the lives of problem
families.
As a decentralized social service program, the activities of the
Children's Departments varied considerably. With some exceptions,
the Departments obtained highly coercive regulatory powers over clients
through extensive discretionary powers to reward or sanction. 4 They
had discretionary funds to pay clients' bills, including rent and utilities;
through arrangements with the other public agencies, they were often
influential in negotiating with the police in delinquency matters, in
obtaining priority rehousing from the public housing authorities for
certified "families at risk," in avoiding or at least delaying threatened
neglect or truancy proceedings, and in obtaining additional funds from
the Ministry of Social Security which administered the basic incomemaintenance program. In many instances, people in trouble were referred to the Children's Departments by other public agencies, but
often people sought the services of the Children's Departments on their
own. In either situation, the Children's Department officers became
enormously powerful either through their own distribution of benefits
or as brokers and intermediaries for other agencies. Although a vast
oversimplification of the operation of the Children's Departments, this
description does illustrate the relationship between the discretionary
distribution of benefits and client dependency.
Because of the present structure of public assistance agencies, the
lack of bureaucratic controls, and the conditioned attitudes of the poor,
we prefer the creation and support of social service agencies outside the
public assistance structure. Although adoption of this proposal might
create the problem of many workers visiting the same family, thereby
complicating the communication and referral process, and might entail
problems of distributing services to people in less densely populated
areas and of encouraging people to use services that are available, many
of these problems exist under current programs and seem incapable of
solution. Public welfare departments currently seem unable to mount
an effective social service program even in urban areas.
The main advantage of this proposal is that it disperses discretionary power by creating options for welfare recipients. The
problem of dependency and coercion will not be vitiated by merely
making social services voluntary as long as they are administered by
one central government agency. But chances of decreasing dependency
improve by making available a diversity of opportunities. A second
34
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advantage is that it frees social services from a single structural arrangement, the public assistance welfare system, thus permitting experimentation in the organization and delivery of social services. For
instance, a variety of approaches have been developed in law and
medicine which may be applicable to social services such as neighborhood and community centers (with or without community control),
offices staffed by government-supported professionals like OEO legal
aid offices, private organizations under government contract, and
private practitioners paid by the government on a case-by-case basis.
Obviously a great variety of structures will be necessary to meet the
many different kinds of problems of delivering effective services.
CONCLUSION
The Mother's Pension laws, the predecessors of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program, were intended to be welfare
programs for "deserving" husbandless mothers. Ironically, husbandless mothers and their children have never been considered deserving.
The administrative characteristics of welfare programs for the "deserving poor" are routinized money payments, clear entitlements, the
absence of regulatory conditions, and the assumption that the recipients
are free to take advantage of other services offered by the community.
In short, welfare programs for the deserving poor are characterized by
the absence of discretionary controls. Yet the AFDC program is replete with discretion at lower administrative levels.3 5 This Article has
attempted to describe the virtually uncontrolled exercise of this discretion and its effect on welfare recipients. The suggestions for reform
are not panaceas. Poverty and dependency will not be eliminated by
reforming administrative structures. But the usual methods of reform--coercive rules with protective standards, public assistance social
service programs, and discretionary distribution of benefits-will not
serve the interests of this dependent population, because they underestimate the power of the bureaucracy to resist change and overestimate
the ability of the recipients to protect themselves from the lawless exercise of official discretion. The poor in our society bear many burdens
and will continue to do so as long as they remain poor, but one of the
burdens that could be diminished is the cost of being subject to so
much discretionary power.
35
For a typology of social welfare legislation based on the "deserving"-"nondeserving" distinction, see Friedman, Social Welfare Legislation: An Introduction, 21
STAr. L. REv. 217 (1969).

